Sudanese Human Rights Activists – Norway
Oslo, 13 March 2026
The Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, and their respective allies in Sudan have recently carried out attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects in Abu Zabad in North Darfur State, Shukairi village in White Nile State, Abu Zabad and Wad Banda in West Kordofan State, the Adikong border market, the city of Dilling, Um Kuraidim village in West Bara locality in North Kordofan State, and El Daein in East Darfur State, according to local testimonies and reliable media reports. The details are as follows:
First: Attacks on Abu Zabad and Wad Banda Localities – West Kordofan
Drone attacks resumed in the Abu Zabad area on the evening of Wednesday, 11 March 2026. A drone attack attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces resulted in deaths, injuries, and the destruction of civilian facilities. This followed drone strikes on Saturday, 7 March, targeting the markets of Abu Zabad and Wad Banda, which killed approximately 40 civilians and injured around 60 others.
Preliminary information indicates that the latest attack took place in a non-military area and targeted a truck carrying women, men, and children who were travelling to attend a social occasion. Medical and local sources also reported that a number of victims were buried in a mass grave because of difficulties transporting their bodies.
First, this attack violates the principle of distinction:
Articles 48 and 51(2) of Additional Protocol I relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, and Rule 1 of customary international humanitarian law [1] [2] [3].
Second, this attack violates the principle of proportionality:
The attack contravenes Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I and Rule 14 of customary international humanitarian law [4] [5].
This attack constitutes a potential war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of the Rome Statute, concerning intentionally directing attacks against civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, with knowledge that the attack would cause excessive loss of civilian life or injury to civilians and damage to non-military objects [6].
Second: Attack on Shukairi Village – White Nile
On the morning of Wednesday, 11 March 2026, Shukairi village in Um Rimta locality, White Nile State, was subjected to bombardment by four drones belonging to the Rapid Support Forces. The attack targeted a secondary school, a hospital, and a health centre, killing at least eight students, four of whom were under the age of 18, as well as teachers and a healthcare worker, and injuring a large number of students.
The attack caused extensive damage to the school, hospital, and health centre, leading to the closure of schools throughout the locality [7]. Reports also indicated that the combined number of people killed and injured exceeded 30.
This attack violates the principle of protection of educational facilities under Article 52 of Additional Protocol I and Rule 10 of customary international humanitarian law [8] [9].
The attack also violates the principle of protection of healthcare facilities, contrary to Article 12 of the First Geneva Convention and Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It may constitute a potential war crime under Article 8, paragraph 9, of the Rome Statute concerning war crimes [10] [11] [12].
Third: Attack on Adikong, Salia, Abu Zabad, and Wad Banda – White Nile State
On the morning of Thursday, 12 March 2026, the crowded Adikong market in West Darfur State, located west of El Geneina near the Adré border crossing with Chad, was struck by a drone attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The attack resulted in civilian casualties and the destruction of shops and private property. Preliminary reports also indicated that fuel storage facilities inside the market had been targeted.
Another drone attack was also launched against the weekly market in Salia.
This attack violates the protection afforded to markets and civilian objects under Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I and Rule 7 of customary international humanitarian law [13] [14].
The attack also violates the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks under Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I and Rule 12 of customary international humanitarian law [15] [16].
The attack may constitute a potential war crime under Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, concerning the targeting of civilians and civilian property [17].
Fourth: Artillery Shelling of Dilling – South Kordofan
On Thursday, 5 March 2026, the Rapid Support Forces and forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement led by Al-Hilu targeted the city of Dilling in South Kordofan with artillery shelling and drone attacks.
The attacks targeted the neighbourhoods of Al-Mak North, Al-Tomat, roads, schools, and the main market.
The attacks resulted in civilian casualties, the exact number of whom has not been confirmed, including a child and three women, one of whom was a Red Crescent volunteer. They also caused the displacement of more than 400 people from the city.
This attack violates the prohibition on the use of wide-area explosive weapons in populated areas under Article 51(5)(a) of Additional Protocol I and Rule 71 of customary international humanitarian law [18] [19].
The attack violates the principle of protection of civilians under Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and may constitute a potential war crime under Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, concerning disproportionate attacks and the targeting of civilians [20] [21].
Potential War Crimes and Violations of International Humanitarian Law
All these attacks may amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute, as the four attacks share the following characteristics:
1- They targeted densely populated civilian areas.
2- They were carried out using inaccurate weapons or weapons with wide-area effects.
3- They resulted in civilian casualties.
4- They showed no apparent compliance with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
Sudanese Human Rights Activists condemns in the strongest possible terms this dangerous escalation of attacks targeting civilians.
Targeting civilians, whether in markets, on public roads, or while travelling for social purposes, constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of distinction and proportionality, which prohibit indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks and require parties to the conflict to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians.
Calls and Demands
Sudanese Human Rights Activists calls on the following parties to take the measures outlined below:
1- The United Nations
A. Open an independent international investigation into the incident, under the supervision of a competent United Nations mechanism.
B. Support and strengthen accountability mechanisms to hold those responsible for ordering or carrying out the attack accountable in accordance with international standards of justice.
C. Strengthen documentation and field monitoring efforts.
D. Provide immediate protection for civilians in conflict areas and ensure that drones or explosive weapons are not used in populated areas.
E. Facilitate humanitarian access to the wounded and survivors and ensure the protection of medical personnel.
Parties to the Conflict
A. Cease all indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians or endangering their lives.
B. Cease all forms of indiscriminate attacks.
C. Refrain from using drones in populated areas.
D. Protect schools, hospitals, and markets.
The International Community
A. Exert pressure to stop the violations.
B. Support victims and displaced persons.
C. Impose sanctions on those responsible for serious crimes.
Justice for the victims, accountability for the perpetrators, and the protection of civilians above all else.
Sudanese Human Rights Activists
Oslo – 13 March 2026
References
[1] https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/362b83/pdf
[2] https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/362b83/pdf
[3] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule1
[4] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[5] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule14
[6] https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute(a).pdf
[7] https://tinyurl.com/2m3u874m
[8] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[9] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule10
[10] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/ihl-treaties/gci-1949/article-12
[11] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b093.html
[12] https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute(a).pdf
[13] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[14] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule7
[15] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[16] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule12
[17] https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute(a).pdf
[18] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[19] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v1/rule71
[20] https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/arab/b094.html
[21] https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/arabic/rome_statute(a).pdf
